Twelve thousand workers build Europe’s largest construction site in Somerset. A £4 billion battery factory rises from farmland, promising 4,000 green tech jobs. International investment floods the region.
Within months, the Somerset Council faces potential bankruptcy.
Special needs children wait months for support that the council cannot fund. A publicly funded community project collapsed after spending £2.89 million with no planning permission, no contract, and no delivery plan. At least 26 contractors remain unpaid. One builder’s wife died from the stress. Police opened a criminal investigation in early June 2025.
This is regional development in 2026: infrastructure booms while public services collapse.
Hinkley Point C: The 94% Workforce Cliff
Hinkley Point C will reach peak construction employment of 15,000 personnel in 2026. The project has trained 1,500 apprentices, with 70% from the South West.
When the power station becomes operational, it needs only 900 people to run it throughout its 60-year lifespan.
Fourteen thousand one hundred jobs disappear—a 94% workforce reduction.
Twenty-six thousand people across Britain work either on-site or through the supply chain. Local productivity in Bridgwater runs 10% higher than in neighboring towns. The district has seen a tenfold increase in medium-sized businesses.
But 35% of the workforce—5,250 people—comes from Britain’s most economically deprived areas. Large infrastructure attracts labor from distressed regions, transforms the local economy, and then contracts dramatically.
The project has generated £17 million in grants for local community projects and £16 million through its Community Fund. The workforce displacement risk remains unaddressed.
Agratas: Phased Construction, Compressed Timeline
Agratas is building Britain’s biggest battery manufacturing facility on a compressed schedule. The 40 GWh factory will supply almost half the battery capacity the UK automotive sector needs by the early 2030s.
Construction started in 2024. The first factory building opens in 2027, a year later than originally planned. When operational, it will create 1,500 jobs initially, expanding to 4,000 once the full site is complete.
Building One alone requires approximately 2,100 construction roles at peak times. The built area spans 244,710 square meters—more than 35% larger than Wembley Stadium.
Somerset manages two massive infrastructure projects transitioning from construction to operations. Hinkley Point C completes in 2026; Agratas follows in 2027. Both follow the same pattern: rapid employment surge, then contraction to specialized operational teams.
Where do 15,000 construction workers go when Hinkley Point C completes? How many transitions to operational roles? How many move to other projects? How many leave the region?
These answers determine whether Somerset’s infrastructure boom creates lasting transformation or mass displacement.
The SEND Crisis: April 2026 Bankruptcy Countdown
Somerset Council faces a financial cliff-edge on March 31, 2026.
The dedicated school grant (DSG) deficit will exceed £100 million by March 31—equivalent to 2,000 unfunded special needs places. The DSG statutory override, the accounting mechanism that keeps this deficit off the council’s main balance sheet, expires that day.
Without government intervention, extending the override or drastically reforming SEND funding, Somerset Council will have little choice but to issue a Section 114 notice the following day. That’s the local government equivalent of declaring bankruptcy.
Parliament’s public accounts committee revealed hundreds of local authorities face the same financial cliff-edge.
Councils’ overspending on SEND could reach between £2.9 billion and £3.9 billion annually by April 2028 nationally. The Department for Education extended the DSG override until April 2028 in June 2025, delaying but not solving the crisis.
The override extension provides breathing space but no structural reform. Special needs children and their families wait while councils manage impossible budgets.
Hinkley Point C and Agratas operate on decade-long planning horizons. SEND funding operates on annual budget cycles with a statutory override expiring in weeks.
One system plans 60-year operational lifespans. The other cannot plan past April 2026.
Red Brick Building: £2.4 Million and a Criminal Investigation
Somerset Council is seeking repayment of £2.29 million in grant funding from Red Brick Building Centre Ltd following the collapse of the Life Factory project in Glastonbury. The total spent was £2.89 million.
The Red Brick board stated it “does not have the financial capacity to repay this sum” and is “preparing for the very real possibility of insolvency.”
Independent auditors found the council had “no assurance” that there was sound governance or financial controls. External auditors issued a statutory warning—the most serious in law.
The project spent £2.89 million despite having no planning permission, no formal contract with the construction firm, no costed delivery plans, and no secured match funding.
Beckery Construction Company, the subsidiary set up to deliver the project, collapsed into liquidation in November owing £686,000. At least 26 contractors remain unpaid.
Avon and Somerset Police commenced criminal enquiries in early June 2025, “following receipt of a report from auditors on behalf of Somerset Council concerning the funding of the Life Factory project.”
A Somerset businessman told the council that unpaid work on the Red Brick project contributed to his wife’s death. Owed £23,746, he stated: “You’ve stolen my wife.” One builder is “virtually suicidal because he’s owed nearly £300,000.”
At least 40 people haven’t been paid despite more than £400,000 remaining in the budget when work stopped in late 2023. R4 Scaffolding and other contractors have waited months for payment.
The project was “six months ahead of schedule” before the collapse. Physical construction progressed successfully while governance failures devastated local businesses.
The Infrastructure Paradox: What Works and What Breaks
Corporate-led infrastructure projects with international backing deliver on schedule. Public sector service delivery collapses under funding gaps and governance failures.
Hinkley Point C and Agratas operate with decade-long planning horizons and specialized project management. They transform regional employment temporarily and create permanent operational jobs.
SEND services operate in crisis management, constrained by annual budget cycles and unfunded mandates. The Red Brick Building collapsed under governance failures, auditors described as having “no assurance” of sound controls.
Projects planned over decades coexist with services that cannot secure funding beyond one fiscal year.
Somerset Council terminated Town Deal funding to Red Brick Building Centre Ltd and is actively seeking to recover £2.29 million already paid, plus an additional £115,715 from the failed Glastonbury Food and Regenerative Farming Centre project. The council’s executive discussed the matter behind closed doors in November due to “commercial sensitivity.”
The council liquidates assets to fund basic services. Institutional capability erodes with each sale. The council raises taxes while cutting services, transferring the burden to residents on fixed incomes.
What Happens Next
The next two years bring three unresolved crises:
Hinkley Point C transitions from 15,000 construction workers to 900 operational staff in 2026. Agratas opens in 2027 with 1,500 operational roles, expanding to 4,000. Where displaced construction workers go remains unaddressed.
Somerset Council’s DSG override was extended to April 2028 in June 2025, delaying the reckoning but offering no structural reform. Hundreds of councils still face insolvency when the extension expires. The £100 million deficit continues to grow.
The Red Brick Building criminal investigation continues. The precedent may alter how public funding is scrutinized across the UK. Twenty-six contractors remain unpaid. The council seeks to recover £2.29 million.
International capital flows to strategic infrastructure. Local governance cannot fund basic services. The gap between what works and what breaks widens.
Somerset is not an anomaly. It is a model: infrastructure investment concentrates around national strategic interests, while public service delivery operates ina permanent funding crisis. The governance strain cannot be resolved through efficiency improvements.
The DSG extension to 2028 proves the point—governments delay crises rather than solve them. This is what regional development looks like when planning horizons diverge by decades.